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We prove the security of a quantum key distribution
scheme based on transmission of squeezed quantum states
of a harmonic oscillator. Our proof employs quantum error-
correcting codes that encode a finite-dimensional quantum
system in the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space of an oscilla-
tor, and protect against errors that shift the canonical vari-
ables p and q. If the noise in the quantum channel is weak,
squeezing signal states by 2.51 dB (a squeeze factor er = 1.34)
is sufficient in principle to ensure the security of a protocol
that is suitably enhanced by classical error correction and pri-
vacy amplification. Secure key distribution can be achieved
over distances comparable to the attenuation length of the
quantum channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two of the most important ideas to emerge from re-
cent studies of quantum information are the concepts of
quantum error correction and quantum key distribution.
Quantum error correction allows us to protect unknown
quantum states from the ravages of the environment.
Quantum key distribution allows us to conceal our pri-
vate discourse from potential eavesdroppers.
In fact these two concepts are more closely related than
is commonly appreciated. A quantum error correction
protocol must be able to reverse the effects of both bit
flip errors, which reflect the polarization state of a qubit
about the x-axis, and phase errors, which reflect the po-
larization about the z-axis. By reversing both types of
errors, the protocol removes any entanglement between
the protected state and the environment, thus restoring
the purity of the state.
In a quantum key distribution protocol, two commu-
nicating parties verify that qubits polarized along both
the x-axis and the z-axis can be transmitted with an ac-
ceptably small probability of error. An eavesdropper who
monitors the x-polarized qubits would necessarily disturb
the z-polarized qubits, while an eavesdropper who moni-
tors the z-polarized qubits would necessarily disturb the
x-polarized qubits. Therefore, a successful verification
test can show that the communication is reasonably pri-
vate, and the privacy can then be amplified via classical
protocols.
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In quantum key distribution, the eavesdropper collects
information by entangling her probe with the transmit-
ted qubits. Thus both error correction and key distribu-
tion share the goal of protecting quantum states against
entanglement with the outside world.
Recently, this analogy between quantum error correc-
tion and quantum key distribution has been sharpened
into a precise connection, and used as the basis of a
new proof of security against all possible eavesdropping
strategies [1]. Earlier proofs of security (first by Mayers
[2], and later by Biham et al. [3]) made no explicit refer-
ence to quantum error correction; nevertheless, the con-
nection between quantum error correction and quantum
key distribution is a powerful tool, enabling us to invoke
the sophisticated formalism of quantum error-correcting
codes in an analysis of the security of quantum key dis-
tribution protocols.
Also recently, new quantum error-correcting codes
have been proposed that encode a finite-dimensional
quantum system in the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space
of a quantum system described by continuous variables
[4]. In this paper, we will apply these new codes to the
analysis of the security of quantum key distribution pro-
tocols. By this method, we prove the security of a proto-
col that is based on the transmission of squeezed quan-
tum states of an oscillator. The protocol is secure against
all eavesdropping strategies allowed by the principles of
quantum mechanics.
In our protocol, the sending party, Alice, chooses at
random to send either a state with a well defined posi-
tion q or momentum p. Then Alice chooses a value of
q or p by sampling a probability distribution, prepares
a narrow wave packet centered at that value, and sends
the wave packet to the receiving party, Bob. Bob decides
at random to measure either q or p. Through public dis-
cussion, Alice and Bob discard their data for the cases
in which Bob measured in a different basis than Alice
used for her preparation, and retain the rest. To correct
for possible errors, which could be due to eavesdropping,
to noise in the channel, or to intrinsic imperfections in
Alice’s preparation and Bob’s measurement, Alice and
Bob apply a classical error correction and privacy am-
plification scheme, extracting from the raw data for n
oscillators a number k < n of key bits.
Alice and Bob also sacrifice some of their data to per-
form a verification test to detect potential eavesdroppers.
When verification succeeds, the probability is exponen-
tially small in n that any eavesdropper has more than an
exponentially small amount of information about the key.
Intuitively, this protocol is secure because an eavesdrop-
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per who monitors the observable q necessarily causes a
detectable disturbance of the complementary observable
p (and vice versa).
Since preparing squeezed states is technically chal-
lenging, it is important to know how much squeezing is
needed to ensure the security of the protocol. The answer
depends on how heavily the wave packets are damaged
during transmission. When the noise in the channel is
weak, we show that it suffices in principle for the squeezed
state to have a width smaller by the factor e−r = .749
than the natural width of a coherent state (correspond-
ing to an improvement by 2.51 dB in the noise power for
the squeezed observable, relative to vacuum noise). It is
also important to know that security can be maintained
under realistic assumptions about the noise and loss in
the channel. Our proof of security applies if the proto-
col is imperfectly implemented, and shows that secure
key distribution can be achieved over distances compara-
ble to the attenuation length of the channel. Squeezed-
state key distribution protocols may have some practical
advantages over single-qubit protocols, in that neither
single-photon sources nor very efficient photodetectors
are needed.
Key distribution protocols using continuous variable
quantum systems have been described previously by oth-
ers [5–7], but ours is the first complete discussion of error
correction and privacy amplification, and the first proof
of security against arbitrary attacks.
In §II we review continuous variable quantum error-
correcting codes [4] and in §III we review the argument
[1] exploiting quantum error-correcting codes to demon-
strate the security of the BB84 quantum key distribution
scheme [8]. This argument is extended to apply to con-
tinuous variable key distribution schemes in §IV and §V.
Estimates of how much squeezing is required to ensure
security of the protocol are presented in §VI. The ef-
fects on security of losses due to photon absorption are
analyzed in §VII, and §VIII contains conclusions.
II. CODES FOR CONTINUOUS QUANTUM
VARIABLES
We begin by describing codes for continuous quantum
variables [4]. The two-dimensional Hilbert space of an en-
coded qubit embedded in the infinite-dimensional Hilbert
space of a system described by canonical variables q and
p can be characterized as the simultaneous eigenspace of
the two commuting operators
Sq = e
i(2
√
pi)q , Sp = e
−i(2√pi)p , (1)
the code’s “stabilizer generators.” If the eigenvalues are
Sq = Sp = 1, then the allowed values of q and p in the
code space are integer multiples of
√
pi, and the code-
words are invariant under shifts in q or p by integer mul-
tiples of 2
√
pi. Thus an orthogonal basis for the encoded
qubit can be chosen as
|0¯〉 ∝
∞∑
s=−∞
|q = (2s) · √pi〉
∝
∞∑
s=−∞
|p = s · √pi〉 ,
|1¯〉 ∝
∞∑
s=−∞
|q = (2s+ 1) · √pi〉
∝
∞∑
s=−∞
(−1)s|p = s · √pi〉 . (2)
The operators
Z¯ ≡ ei(
√
pi)q , X¯ ≡ e−i(
√
pi)p , (3)
commute with the stabilizer generators and so preserve
the code subspace; they act on the basis eq. (2) according
to
Z¯ : |0¯〉 → |0¯〉 , |1¯〉 → −|1¯〉 ,
X¯ : |0¯〉 → |1¯〉 , |1¯〉 → |0¯〉 . (4)
This code is designed to protect against errors that
induce shifts in the values of q and p. To correct such
errors, we measure the values of the stabilizer generators
to determine the values of q and p modulo
√
pi, and then
apply a shift transformation to adjust q and p to the
nearest integer multiples of
√
pi. If the errors induce shifts
∆q, ∆p that satisfy
|∆q| < √pi/2 , |∆p| < √pi/2 , (5)
then the encoded state can be perfectly restored.
A code that protects against shifts is obtained for any
choice of the eigenvalues of the stabilizer generators. The
code with
Sq = e
2piiφq , Sp = e
−2piiφp , (6)
can be obtained from the φq = φp = 0 code by applying
the phase space translation operator
ei
√
pi(qφp)e−i
√
pi(pφq) ; (7)
the angular variables φq and φp ∈ (−1/2, 1/2] denote the
allowed values of q/
√
pi and p/
√
pi modulo an integer. In
this code space, the encoded operations Z¯ and X¯ (which
square to the identity) can be chosen to be
Z¯(φq) = e
i
√
pi(q−φq
√
pi) , X¯(φp) = e
−i√pi(p−φp
√
pi) . (8)
The code with stabilizer eq. (1) can be generalized in
a variety of ways [4]. For example, we can increase the
dimension of the protected code space, and we can modify
the code to protect against shifts that are asymmetric in
q and in p. If we choose the stabilizer to be
Sq(n, α) = exp
[
i(
√
2pid) · (q/α)
]
,
Sp(n, α) = exp
[
−i(
√
2pid) · (pα)
]
, (9)
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where d is a positive integer and α is a positive real num-
ber, then the code has dimension d and protects against
shifts that satisfy
|∆q| < α
2
·
√
2pi
d
, |∆p| < 1
2α
·
√
2pi
d
. (10)
The codewords eq. (2) are nonnormalizable states, in-
finitely “squeezed” in q and p. In practice, we must
always work with normalizable finitely squeezed states.
For example, a Gaussian approximation |0˜〉 to the ideal
codeword |0¯〉 of the d = 2, α = 1 code, characterized by
squeezing parameters ∆q,∆p << 1, is
|0˜〉 ≈
(
4
pi
)1/4 ∫ ∞
−∞
dq |q〉 e− 12 (∆2p)q2
×
∞∑
s=−∞
e−
1
2
(q−2s√pi)2/∆2q
≈ 1
pi1/4
∫ ∞
−∞
dp |p〉 e− 12 (∆2q)p2
×
∞∑
s=−∞
e−
1
2
(p−s√pi)2/∆2p ; (11)
the approximate codeword |0˜〉 can be obtained by sub-
jecting |0¯〉 to shifts in q and p governed by Gaussian
distributions with widths ∆q and ∆p respectively. If ∆q
and ∆p are small, then in principle these shifts can be
corrected with high probability: e.g, for ∆q = ∆p ≡ ∆,
the probability that a shift in q or p causes an uncor-
rectable error is no worse than the probability that the
size of the shift exceeds
√
pi/2, or
Error Prob ≤ 2√
pi∆2
∫ ∞
√
pi/2
dq e−q
2/∆2
≤ 2∆
pi
exp(−pi/4∆2) . (12)
For the d = 2 code with α 6= 1, this same estimate of the
error probability applies if we rescale the widths appro-
priately,
∆q = ∆ · α , ∆p = ∆/α . (13)
We can concatenate a shift-resistant code with an
[[n, k, d]] stabilizer quantum code. That is, first we en-
code (say) a qubit in each of n oscillators; then k better
protected qubits are embedded in the block of n. If the
typical shifts are small, then the qubit error rate will be
small in each of the n oscillators, and the error rate in the
k protected qubits will be much smaller. The quantum
key distribution protocols that we propose are based on
such concatenated codes.
We note quantum codes for continuous quantum vari-
ables with an infinite-dimensional code space were de-
scribed earlier by Braunstein [9], and by Lloyd and Slo-
tine [10]. Entanglement distillation protocols for contin-
uous variable systems have also been proposed [11,12]
III. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION AND
QUANTUM ERROR-CORRECTING CODES
Now let’s recall the connection between stabilizer
quantum codes and quantum key distribution schemes
[1].
We say that a protocol for quantum key distribution is
secure if (1) the eavesdropper Eve is unable to collect a
significant amount of information about the key without
being detected, (2) the communicating parties Alice and
Bob receive the same key bits with high probability, and
(3) the key generated is essentially random. Then if the
key is intercepted, Alice and Bob will know it is unsafe to
use the key and can make further attempts to establish
a secure key. If eavesdropping is not detected, the key
can be safely used as a one-time pad for encoding and
decoding.1
Establishing that a protocol is secure is tricky, because
there inevitably will be some noise in the quantum chan-
nel used to distribute the key, and the effects of eaves-
dropping could be confused with the effects of the noise.
Hence the protocol must incorporate error correction to
establish a shared key despite the noise, and privacy am-
plification to control the amount of information about
the key that can be collected by the eavesdropper.
In the case of the BB84 key distribution invented by
Bennett and Brassard [8], the necessary error correction
and privacy amplification are entirely classical. Never-
theless, the formalism of quantum error correction can
be usefully invoked to show that the error correction and
privacy amplification work effectively [1]. The key point
is that if Alice and Bob carry out the BB84 protocol, we
can show that the eavesdropper is no better off than if
they had executed a protocol that applies quantum error
correction to the transmitted quantum states. Appealing
to the observation that Alice and Bob could have applied
quantum error correction (even though they didn’t really
apply it), we place limits on what Eve can know about
the key.
A. Entanglement distillation
First we will describe a key distribution protocol that
uses a quantum error-correcting code to purify entan-
glement, and will explain why the protocol is secure.
1We implicitly assume that Eve uses a strategy that passes
the verification test with nonnegligible probability, so that
the rate of key generation is not exponentially small. If, for
example, Eve were to intercept all qubits sent by Alice and
resend them to Bob, then she would almost certainly be de-
tected, and key bits would not be likely to be generated. But
in the rare event that she is not detected and some key bits
are generated, Eve would know a lot about them.
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The connection between quantum error correction and
entanglement purification was first emphasized by Ben-
nett et al. [13]; our proof of security follows a proof by
Lo and Chau [14] for a similar key distribution protocol.
Later, following [1], we will see how the entanglement-
purification protocol is related to the BB84 protocol.
A stabilizer code can be used as the basis of an
entanglement-purification protocol with one-way classi-
cal communication [13,14]. Two parties, both equipped
with quantum computers, can use this protocol to ex-
tract from their initial shared supply of noisy Bell pairs
a smaller number of Bell pairs with very high fidelity.
These purified Bell pairs can then be employed for EPR
quantum key distribution. Because the distilled pairs are
very nearly pure, the quantum state of the pairs has neg-
ligible entanglement with the quantum state of the probe
of any potential eavesdropper; therefore no measurement
of the probe can reveal any useful information about the
secret key.
Let’s examine the distillation protocol in greater detail.
Suppose that Alice and Bob start out with n shared EPR
pairs. Ideally, these pairs should be in the state
|Φ(n)〉 ≡ |φ+〉⊗n , (14)
where |φ+〉 is the Bell state (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2; however,
the pairs are noisy, approximating |Φ(n)〉 with imperfect
fidelity. They wish to extract k < n pairs that are less
noisy.
For this purpose, they have agreed in advance to use
a particular [[n, k, d]] stabilizer code. The code space
can be characterized as a simultaneous eigenspace of a
set of mutually commuting stabilizer generators {Mi, i =
1, 2, . . . , n− k}. Each Mi is a “Pauli operator,” a tensor
product of n single-qubit operators where each single-
qubit operator is one of {I,X, Y, Z} defined by
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (15)
The operations {X¯a, Z¯a, a = 1, 2, . . . , k} acting on the
encoded qubits are Pauli operators that commute with
all of the Mi.
The Bell state |φ+〉 is the simultaneous eigenstate with
eigenvalue one of the two commuting operators XA⊗XB
and ZA⊗ZB (where subscripts A and B indicate whether
the operator acts on Alice’s or Bob’s qubit). Thus the
state |Φ(n)〉 is the simultaneous eigenstate with eigen-
value one of the commuting operators
Mi,A ⊗Mi,B , i = 1, 2, . . . , n− k ,
X¯a,A ⊗ X¯a,B , a = 1, 2, . . . , k ,
Z¯a,A ⊗ Z¯a,B , a = 1, 2, . . . , k . (16)
Now suppose that Alice and Bob both measure the n−k
commuting Mi’s. If the state they measure is pre-
cisely |Φ(n)〉, then Alice and Bob obtain identical mea-
surement outcomes. Furthermore, since their measure-
ments do not disturb the encoded operations X¯a and
Z¯a, their measurement would prepare the encoded state
|Φ¯(k)〉 ≡ |φ¯+〉⊗k, the encoded state with
X¯a,A ⊗ X¯a,B = Z¯a,A ⊗ Z¯a,B = 1 ,
a = 1, 2, . . . , k , (17)
in the code subspace with the specified values of Mi =
±1.
However, since the initial pairs are noisy, Alice’s and
Bob’s measurement of theMi’s need not match perfectly;
they should apply error correction to improve the fidelity
of their encoded pairs. Thus Alice broadcasts the values
of the Mi,A’s that she obtained in her measurements.
Comparing to his own measurements, Bob computes the
relative syndrome Mi,A ·Mi,B. From this relative syn-
drome, he infers what recovery operation he should apply
to his qubits to ensure that theMi,B’s match theMi,A’s,
and he performs this operation. Now Alice and Bob are
in possession of k encoded pairs with improved fidelity.
These encoded pairs can be used for EPR key distri-
bution. For each a = 1, 2, . . . , k, Alice and Bob measure
Z¯a, obtaining outcomes that are essentially random and
agree with high probability. These outcomes are their
shared private key.
B. Verification
If the initial pairs are too noisy, either because of the
intervention of an eavesdropper or for other reasons, then
the purification protocol might not succeed. Alice and
Bob need to sacrifice some of their EPR pairs to verify
that purification is likely to work. If verification fails,
they can abort the protocol.
Under what conditions will purification succeed? If
their pairs were perfect, each would be in the state |φ+〉,
the simultaneous eigenstate with eigenvalue one of the
two commuting observables X ⊗X and Z ⊗ Z. Suppose
for a moment, that each of the pairs is a simultaneous
eigenstate of these observables (a Bell state), but not
necessarily with the right eigenvalues: in fact no more
than tX of the n pairs have X ⊗X = −1, and no more
than tZ of the n pairs have Z ⊗ Z = −1. Then, if Alice
and Bob use a stabilizer code that can correct up to tZ
bit flip errors and up to tX phase errors, the purification
protocol will work perfectly — it will yield the encoded
state |Φ¯(k)〉 = |φ¯+〉⊗k with fidelity F = 1.
Now, the initial n pairs might not all be in Bell states.
But suppose that Alice and Bob were able to perform a
Bell measurement on each pair, projecting it onto a si-
multaneous eigenstate of X ⊗X and Z ⊗ Z. Of course,
since Alice and Bob are far apart from one another, they
cannot really do this Bell measurement. But let’s never-
theless imagine that they first perform a Bell measure-
ment on each pair, and then proceed with the purifica-
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tion protocol. Purification works if the Bell measurement
yields no more than tX pairs with X ⊗X = −1 and no
more than tZ pairs with Z ⊗ Z = −1. Therefore, if the
initial state of the n pairs has the property that Bell
measurement applied to all the pairs will, with very high
probability, produce pairs with no more than tZ bit flip
errors and no more than tX phase errors, then we are
assured that Bell measurement followed by purification
will produce a very high fidelity approximation to the
encoded state |Φ¯(k)〉.
But what if Alice and Bob execute the purification
protocol without first performing the Bell measurement?
We know that the purification works perfectly applied to
the space Hgood spanned by Bell pairs that differ from
|φ+〉⊗n by no more than tZ bit flip errors and no more
than tX phase errors. Let Π denote the projection onto
Hgood . Then if the protocol is applied to an initial den-
sity operator ρ of the n pairs, the final density operator
ρ′ approximates |Φ¯(k)〉 with fidelity
F ≡ 〈Φ¯(k)|ρ′|Φ¯(k)〉 ≥ tr(Πρ) . (18)
Therefore, the fidelity is at least as large as the probabil-
ity that tZ or fewer bit flip errors and tX or fewer phase
errors would have been found if Bell measurement had
been performed on all n pairs.
To derive the inequality eq. (18), we represent ρ as a
pure state |Ψ〉SE of the n pairs (the “system” S) and
an ancilla (the “environment” E, which might be under
Eve’s control). The recovery superoperator can be repre-
sented as a unitary operator USR that is applied to S and
an auxiliary system (the “reservoir” R) that serves as a
repository for the entropy drawn from the pairs by error
correction. Denote the initial pure state of the reservoir
by |0〉R. Then the state of system, environment, and
reservoir to which the recovery operation is applied can
be resolved into a “good” component
|Ψgood〉SER = (ΠS ⊗ IER) |Ψ〉SE ⊗ |0〉R , (19)
and an orthogonal component
|Ψbad〉SER = ((IS −ΠS)⊗ IER) |Ψ〉SE ⊗ |0〉R . (20)
Since the states |Ψgood〉SER and |Ψbad〉SER are orthogo-
nal, the unitary recovery operation USR⊗ IE maps them
to states |Ψ′good〉SER and |Ψ′bad〉SER that are also orthog-
onal to one another. Furthermore, since recovery works
perfectly on the space Hgood, we have
|Ψ′good〉SER = |Φ¯(k)〉S ⊗ |junk〉ER , (21)
where the state |junk〉ER of environment and reservoir
has norm
ER〈junk|junk〉ER = SER〈Ψ′good|Ψ′good〉SER
= SER〈Ψgood|Ψgood〉SER = tr(Πρ) . (22)
Thus the fidelity of the recovered state can be ex-
pressed as
F = SER〈Ψ′|
(
|Φ¯(k)〉S S〈Φ¯(k)|
)
⊗ IER|Ψ′〉SER
= SER〈Ψ′good|
(
|Φ¯(k)〉S S〈Φ¯(k)|
)
⊗ IER|Ψ′good〉SER
+ SER〈Ψ′bad|
(
|Φ¯(k)〉S S〈Φ¯(k)|
)
⊗ IER|Ψ′bad〉SER
= tr(Πρ) + 〈Φ¯(k)|ρ′bad|Φ¯(k)〉 ≥ tr(Πρ) , (23)
where
ρ′bad = trER (|Ψ′bad〉SER SER〈Ψ′bad|) ; (24)
eq. (18) then follows. The key point is that, because
of eq. (21), and because |Ψ′good〉SER and |Ψ′bad〉SER are
orthogonal, there is no “good-bad” cross term in eq. (23).
Our arguments so far show that Alice and Bob can
be assured that entanglement purification will work very
well if they know that it is highly unlikely that more than
tZ bit flip errors or more than tX phase errors would
have been found if they had projected their pairs onto
the Bell basis. While they have no way of directly check-
ing whether this condition is satisfied, they can conduct
a test that, if successful, will provide them with high sta-
tistical confidence. We must now suppose that Alice and
Bob start out with more than n pairs; to be definite,
suppose they have about 2n to start, and that they are
willing to sacrifice about half of them to conduct their
verification test. Alice randomly decides which pairs are
for verification (the “check pairs”) and which are for key
distribution (the “key pairs”), and for each of her check
qubits, she randomly decides to measure either X or Z.
Then Alice publicly announces which are the check pairs,
whether she measured X or Z on her half of each check
pair, and the results of those measurements (in addition
to the results of her measurements of the stabilizer gen-
erators).
Upon hearing of Alice’s choices, Bob measures X or Z
on his half of each of the check pairs; thus Alice and Bob
are able to measure X ⊗X on about half of their check
pairs, and they measure Z ⊗ Z on the remaining check
pairs. Now since the check pairs were randomly chosen,
the eavesdropper Eve has no way of knowing which are
the check pairs, and she can’t treat them any differently
than the key pairs; hence the measured error rate found
for the check pairs will be representative of the error rate
that would have been found on the key pairs if Alice
and Bob had projected the key pairs onto the Bell basis.
Therefore, Alice and Bob can use their check data and
classical sampling theory to estimate how many bit flip
and phase errors would have been expected if they had
measured the key pairs.
For example, in a sample of N pairs, suppose that if
Alice and Bob both measured Z for all the pairs, a frac-
tion p of their measurements would disagree, indicating
bit flip errors. Then if they randomly sample M < N
of the pairs, the probability distribution for the number
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M(p− ε) of errors found would be2
P (ε) < exp(−Mε2/2p(1− p)) . (25)
If Alice and Bob have no a priori knowledge of the value
of p, then by Bayes’ theorem, the conditional probability
that the total number of errors in the population is pN ,
given that there are pZM errors in the sample, is the
same as the probability that there are pZM errors in
the sample given that there are pN errors in the total
population. Writing p = pZ + ε, the number of errors on
the N −M untested pairs is Np−MpZ = (N −M)pZ +
Nε = (N − M) · (pZ + ε′), where ε′ = Nε/(N − M).
Expressing P (ε) in terms of ε′ we find
P (ε′) < exp
(
−M(N −M)
2ε′2
2N2pZ(1− pZ)
)
, (26)
a bound on the probability that the fraction of the
untested pairs with errors is larger than pZ+ε
′. In partic-
ular, if they test about M = n/2 pairs for bit flip errors
out of a total of about N = n+n/2 pairs, the probability
that a fraction pZ +ε
′ of the remaining N −M = n pairs
have bit flip errors is
P (ε′) < exp
(−nε′2/9pZ(1− pZ)) . (27)
A similar argument applies to the probability of phase
errors. We conclude that by conducting the verification
test, Alice and Bob can be very confident that, if they had
measured Z ⊗Z (or X ⊗X) on the n key pairs, no more
than (pZ + ε
′)n (or (pX + ε′)n) errors would have been
found. By choosing a quantum error-correcting code that
can correct this many errors with high probability, they
can be confident that the encoded state they prepare ap-
proximates |Φ¯(k)〉 with fidelity exponentially close to one.
It is important to emphasize that this argument re-
quires no assumption about how the errors on different
pairs may be correlated with one another. Rather the
argument is applied to a hypothetical situation in which
the value of Z ⊗ Z (or X ⊗ X) already has been mea-
sured and recorded for all of the check pairs and all of the
key pairs. Sampling theory is then used to address the
question: how reliably does a “poll” of M bits randomly
chosen from among N allow us to predict the behavior
of the rest of the population. Classical sampling theory
can be applied to the values of both Z ⊗ Z and X ⊗X
for the key pairs, because the operators commute and so
are simultaneously measurable in principle [14].
Furthermore, if the state of the encoded pairs that Al-
ice and Bob use for key distribution is exponentially close
to being a pure state, it follows from Holevo’s theorem
2This bound is not tight. It applies if the sample of M pairs
is chosen from the population of N with replacement. In fact
the sample is chosen without replacement, which suppresses
the fluctuations. A better bound was quoted in [1].
that Eve’s mutual information with the distributed key is
exponentially small [14,1]. In the worst case, the imper-
fect fidelity of Alice’s and Bob’s pairs is entirely due to
Eve’s intervention; then the complete state consisting of
the pairs and Eve’s probe is pure, and the Von Neumann
entropy S(ρE) ≡ −tr ρE log ρE of the state ρE of the
probe equals the entropy of the state ρAB of the pairs.
By extracting a key from their pairs, Alice and Bob in
effect prepare a state for Eve governed by an ensemble
with density matrix ρE . According to Holevo’s theorem,
the mutual information I(AB;E) of this state prepara-
tion with any measurement that Eve can carry out on
her probe satisfies
I(AB;E) ≤ S(ρE) = S(ρAB) , (28)
and since ρAB is very nearly pure, S(ρAB) and I(AB;E)
are very close to zero. Specifically, if the fidelity of ρAB
is F = 1−δ, then the largest eigenvalue of ρAB is at least
1−δ. For a system with dimension D, the density matrix
with largest eigenvalue 1 − δ that has the maximal Von
Neumann entropy is
ρmax = diag
(
1− δ, δ
D − 1 ,
δ
D − 1 , . . . ,
δ
D − 1
)
. (29)
for which
S(ρmax) = −(1− δ) log2(1− δ)− δ log2(δ/(D − 1))
= δ ·
(
1
loge 2
+ log2(D − 1)− log2 δ
)
+O(δ2) . (30)
TakingD = 22k (the total dimension of Alice’s and Bob’s
code spaces), we conclude that
S(ρAB) ≤ δ ·
(
1
loge 2
+ 2k + log2(1/δ)
)
+O(δ2) . (31)
Finally, we have shown that if the verification test suc-
ceeds, then with probability exponentially close to one
(the probability that the error rate inferred from the
check sample is not seriously misleading), Eve’s mutual
information with the key is exponentially small (because
the state of the key bits approximates |Φ¯(k)〉 with fidelity
exponentially close to one). This proof of security ap-
plies to any conceivable eavesdropping strategy adopted
by Eve.
The proof relies on the ability of quantum error-
correcting codes to reverse the errors caused by inter-
actions between the key pairs and Eve’s probe. Hence
it may seem odd that the proof works for arbitrary at-
tacks by Eve, since quantum error correction works effec-
tively only for a restricted class of error superoperators.
Specifically, the error superoperator acting on a block of
n qubits can be expanded in terms of a basis of “Pauli
error operators,” where in each term of the expansion bit
flip errors and/or phase errors are inflicted on specified
qubits within the block. The encoded quantum informa-
tion is well protected only if the error superoperator has
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nearly all of its support on Pauli operators that can be
corrected by the code, e.g., those with no more than tZ
bit flip errors and tX phase errors.
If Eve’s probe interacts collectively with many qubits,
it may cause more bit flip or phase errors than the code
can correct. But the crucial point is that, with high
probability, an attack that causes many errors on the
key bits will also cause many errors on the check bits,
and Alice and Bob will detect Eve’s presence.
C. Reduction to the BB84 protocol
Since the entanglement distillation protocol requires
only one-way classical communication, this protocol is
actually equivalent to one in which Alice, rather than
preparing Bell pairs and sending half of each pair to
Bob, instead prepares an encoded quantum state that
she sends to Bob. Using a set of stabilizer generators
on which she and Bob have agreed in advance, Alice
chooses a random eigenvalue for each stabilizer generator
Mi; then employing the corresponding [[n, k, d]] quantum
code, she prepares one of 2k mutually orthogonal code-
words.
Alice also decides at random which of her qubits will
be used for key distribution and which will be used for
verification. For each of the check bits, she decides at
random whether to send an X eigenstate (with random
eigenvalue) or a Z eigenstate (with random eigenvalue).
Bob receives the qubits sent by Alice, carefully deposits
them in his quantum memory, and publicly announces
that the qubits have been received. Alice then publicly
reveals which qubits were used for the key, and which
qubits are the check qubits. She announces the stabilizer
eigenvalues that she chose to encode her state, and for
each check qubit, she announces whether it was prepared
as an X or Z eigenstate, and with what eigenvalue.
Once Bob learns which qubits carry the encoded key in-
formation, he measures the stabilizer operators and com-
pares his results with Alice’s to obtain a relative error
syndrome. He then performs error recovery and mea-
sures the encoded state to decipher the key.
Bob also measures the check qubits and compares the
outcomes to the values announced by Alice, to obtain
an estimate of the error rate. If the error rate is low
enough, error recovery applied to the encoded key bits
will succeed with high probability, and Alice and Bob
can be confident in the security of the key. If the error
rate is too high, Bob informs Alice and they abort the
protocol.
As described so far, the protocol requires that Alice
and Bob have quantum memories and quantum comput-
ers that are used to store the qubits, measure stabilizer
generators, and correct errors. But if they use a stabilizer
code of the CSS (Calderbank-Shor-Steane) type [15,16],
then the protocol can be simplified further. The crucial
property of the CSS codes is that there is a clean separa-
tion between the syndrome information needed to correct
bit flip errors and the syndrome information needed to
correct phase errors.
A CSS quantum stabilizer code is associated with a
classical binary linear code C1 on n bits, and a subcode
C2 ⊂ C1. Let H1 denote the parity check matrix of C1
and H2 the generator matrix for the code C2 (and hence
the parity check matrix of the dual code C⊥2 ). The stabi-
lizer generators of the code are of two types. Associated
with the ith row of the matrix H1 is a “Z-generator,” the
tensor product of I’s and Z’s
MZ,i = ⊗nj=1(Zj)(H1)ij , (32)
and associated with the ith row of H2 is an “X-
generator,” the tensor product of I’s and X ’s
MX,i = ⊗nj=1(Xj)(H2)ij . (33)
Since H1 has n− k1 rows, where k1 = dim(C1), and H2
has k2 rows, where k2 = dim(C2) there are all together
n − k1 + k2 stabilizer generators, and the dimension of
the code space (the number of encoded qubits) is k =
k1−k2. From measurements of the Z generators, bit flip
errors can be diagnosed, and from measurement of the X
generators, phase errors can be diagnosed.
The elements of a basis for the code space with eigen-
values of stabilizer generators
MZ,i = (−1)si , MX,i = (−1)ti (34)
are in one-to-one correspondence with the k cosets of C2
in C1; they can be chosen as
|ψ(v)〉x,z = 1|C2|1/2
∑
w∈C2
(−1)z·w|v + w + x〉 ; (35)
here v ∈ C1 is a representative of a C2 coset, and x, z
are n-bit strings satisfying
H1x = s , H2z = t . (36)
Thus, to distribute the key, Alice chooses x and z at ran-
dom, encodes one of the |ψ(v)〉x,z ’s, and sends the state
to Bob. After Bob confirms receipt, Alice broadcasts the
values of x and z. Bob compares Alice’s values to his
own measurements of the stabilizer generators to infer
a relative syndrome, and he performs error correction.
Then Bob measures Z of each of his n qubits, obtaining
a bit string v+w+x. Finally, he subtracts x and applies
H2 to compute H2v, from which he can infer the coset
represented by v and hence the key.
Now notice that Bob extracts the encoded key infor-
mation by measuring Z of each of the qubits that Alice
sends. Thus Bob can correctly decipher the key informa-
tion by correcting any bit flip errors that occur during
transmission. Bob does not need to correct phase errors,
and therefore he has no use for the phase syndrome in-
formation; hence there is no need for Alice to send it.
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Without in any way weakening the effectiveness of the
protocol, Alice can prepare the encoded state |ψ(v)〉x,z ,
but discard her value of z, rather then transmitting it;
thus we can consider the state sent by Alice to be av-
eraged over the value of z. Averaging over the phase
(−1)z·w destroys the coherence of the sum over w ∈ C2
in |ψ(v)〉x,z ; in effect, then, Alice is preparing n qubits as
Z eigenstates, in the state |v+w + x〉, sending the state
to Bob, and later broadcasting the value of x. We can
just as well say that Alice sends a random string u, and
later broadcasts the value of u + v. Bob receives u + e
(where e has support on the bits that flip due to errors)
extracts v + e, corrects it to the nearest C1 codeword,
and infers the key, the coset v + C2.
Alice and Bob can carry out this protocol even if Bob
has no quantum memory. Alice decides at random to
prepare her qubits as X or Z eigenstates, with random
eigenvalues, and Bob decides at random to measure in
the X or Z basis. After public discussion, Alice and Bob
discard the results in the cases where they used different
bases and retain the results where they used the same
basis. Thus the protocol we have described is just the
BB84 protocol invented by Bennett and Brassard [8], ac-
companied by classical error correction (adjusting v + e
to a C1 codeword) and privacy amplification (extracting
the coset v + C2).
What error rate is acceptable? In a random CSS code,
about half of the n − k generators correct bit flips, and
about half correct phase flips. Suppose that the verifica-
tion test finds that bit flip errors (ZA ⊗ZB = −1) occur
with probability pZ and phase errors (XA⊗XB = −1) oc-
cur with probability pX . Classical coding theory shows
that a random CSS code can correct the bit flips with
high probability if the number of typical errors on n bits
is much smaller than the number of possible bit flip error
syndromes, which holds provided that(
n
npZ
)
2−(n−k)/2 ∼ 2nH2(pZ)−(n−k)/2 ≪ 1 , (37)
whereH2(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary
entropy function. Similarly, the phase errors can be cor-
rected with high probability provided the same relation
holds with pZ replaced by pX . Therefore, asymptotically
as n → ∞, secure key bits can be extracted from trans-
mitted key bits at any rate R satisfying
R =
k
n
< 1− 2H2(pZ) ,
R =
k
n
< 1− 2H2(pX) . (38)
This upper bound on R crosses zero at pZ (or pX) =
.1100. We conclude that secure key distribution is possi-
ble if pX,Z < 11%.
The random coding argument applies if the errors in
the key qubits are randomly distributed. To assure that
this is so, we can direct Alice to perform a random per-
mutation of the qubits before sending them to Bob. After
Bob confirms receipt, Alice can broadcast the permuta-
tion she performed, and Bob can invert it.
Again, the essence of this argument is that the amount
of information that an eavesdropper could acquire is lim-
ited by how successfully we could have carried out quan-
tum error correction if we had chosen to – and that this
relation holds irrespective of whether we really imple-
mented the quantum error correction or not.
Other proofs of the security of the BB84 protocol have
been presented [2,3], which don’t make direct use of this
connection with quantum error-correcting codes. How-
ever, these proofs do use classical error correction and pri-
vacy amplification, and they implicitly exploit the struc-
ture of the CSS codes.
D. Imperfect sources
Our objective in this paper is to analyze the secu-
rity of key distribution schemes that use systems de-
scribed by continuous quantum variables. The analysis
will follow the strategy we have just outlined, in which an
entanglement-purification protocol is reduced to a pro-
tocol that does not require the distribution of entangle-
ment. But first we need to discuss a more general version
of the argument.
In the entanglement-purification protocol, whose re-
duction to the BB84 protocol we have just described,
there is an implicit limitation on the eavesdropper’s ac-
tivity. We have assumed that Alice prepares perfect en-
tangled pairs in the state |φ+〉, and then sends half of
each pair to Bob. Eve has been permitted to tamper with
the qubits that are sent to Bob in any way she chooses,
but she has not been allowed any contact with Alice’s
qubits. Therefore, if we imagine that Alice measures her
qubits before sending to Bob, we obtain a BB84 proto-
col in which Alice is equipped with a perfect source of
polarized qubits. When she sends a Z eigenstate, the
decision to emit a |0〉 or a |1〉 is perfectly random, and
the state emerges from her source with perfect fidelity.
Similarly, when she sends an X eigenstate, the decision
to send |±〉 ≡ (|0〉±|1〉)/√2 is perfectly random, and the
state is prepared with perfect fidelity. Furthermore, Eve
has no knowledge of what Alice’s source does, other than
what she is able to infer by probing the qubits as they
travel to Bob.
Security can be maintained in a more general scenario.
In the entanglement-purification protocol, we can allow
Eve access to Alice’s qubits. As long as Eve has no way
of knowing which pairs Alice and Bob will select for their
verification test, and no way of knowing whether the
check pairs will be measured in the Z or X basis, then
the protocol still works: eavesdropping can be detected
irrespective of whether Eve probes Alice’s qubits, Bob’s
qubits, or both.
Now if we imagine that Alice measures her qubits be-
fore sending to Bob, we obtain a BB84-like protocol in
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which Alice’s source is imperfect and/or Eve is able to
collect some information about how Alice’s source be-
haves. Our proof that the BB84-like protocol is secure
still works as before. However the proof applies only to a
restricted type of source— it must be possible to simulate
Alice’s source exactly by measuring half of a two-qubit
state.
To be concrete, consider the following special case,
which will suffice for our purposes: Alice has many iden-
tical copies of the two-qubit state ρAB. To prepare a
“Z-state” she measures qubit A in the basis {|0〉A, |1〉A}.
Thus she sends to Bob one of the two states
ρ0 =
A〈0|ρAB|0〉A
tr (A〈0|ρAB|0〉A) ,
ρ1 =
A〈1|ρAB|1〉A
tr (A〈1|ρAB|1〉A) , (39)
chosen with respective probabilities
Prob(0) = tr (A〈0|ρAB|0〉A) ,
Prob(1) = tr (A〈1|ρAB|1〉A) . (40)
Similarly, to prepare anX-state she measures in the basis
{|+〉, |−〉}, sending one of
ρ+ =
A〈+|ρAB|+〉A
tr (A〈+|ρAB|+〉A) ,
ρ− =
A〈−|ρAB|−〉A
tr (A〈−|ρAB|−〉A) , (41)
chosen with respective probabilities
Prob(+) = tr (A〈+|ρAB|+〉A) ,
Prob(−) = tr (A〈−|ρAB|−〉A) . (42)
Unless the state ρAB is precisely the pure state |φ+〉, Al-
ice’s source isn’t doing exactly what it is supposed to do.
Depending on how ρAB is chosen, the source might be
biased; for example it might send ρ0 with higher proba-
bility than ρ1. And the states ρ0 and ρ1 need not be the
perfectly prepared |0〉 and |1〉 that the protocol calls for.
Now suppose that Alice’s source always emits one of
the states ρ0, ρ1, ρ+, ρ−, and that after the qubits emerge
from the source, Eve is free to probe them any way she
pleases. Even though Alice’s source is flawed, Alice and
Bob can perform verification, error correction, and pri-
vacy amplification just as in the BB84 protocol. To ver-
ify, Bob measures Z or X , as before; if he measures Z,
say, they check to see whether Bob’s outcome |0〉 or |1〉
agrees with whether Alice sent ρ0 or ρ1 (even though the
state that Alice sent may not have been a Z eigenstate).
Thereby, Alice and Bob estimate error rates pZ and pX .
If both error rates are below 11%, then the protocol is
secure.
We emphasize again that the security criterion
pX , pZ < 11% applies not to all sources, but only to the
restricted class of imperfect sources that can be simulated
by measuring half of a (possible noisy) entangled state.
To give an extreme example of a type of source to which
the security proof does not apply, suppose that Alice al-
ways sends the Z-state |0〉 or the X-state |+〉. Clearly
the key distribution protocol will fail, even if Bob’s bits
always agree with Alice’s! Indeed, a source with these
properties cannot be obtained by measuring half of any
two-qubit state ρAB. Rather, if the source is obtained by
such a measurement, then a heavy bias when we send a
Z-state would require that the error probability be large
when we send an X-state.
IV. DISTRIBUTING A KEY BIT WITH
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Now let’s consider how the above ideas can be applied
to continuous variable systems. We will first describe how
in principle Alice and Bob can extract good encoded pairs
of qubits from noisy EPR pairs. However, the distillation
protocol requires them to make measurements that are
difficult in practice. Then we will see how key distribu-
tion that invokes (difficult) entanglement distillation can
be reduced to key distribution based on (easier) prepa-
ration, transmission, and detection of squeezed states.
Suppose that Alice and Bob share pairs of oscillators.
Ideally each pair has been prepared in an EPR state, a
simultaneous eigenstate (let’s say with eigenvalue 0) of
qA − qB and pA + pB. Now suppose that Alice mea-
sures the two commuting stabilizer generators defined in
eq. (1), obtaining the outcomes
Sq,A = e
2piiφq,A , Sp,A = e
−2piiφp,A , (43)
or
qA = φq,A ·
√
pi (mod
√
pi) ,
pA = φp,A ·
√
pi (mod
√
pi) . (44)
Now, the initial state was an eigenstate with eigenvalue
one of the operators Sq,A ⊗ S−1q,B and Sp,A ⊗ Sp,B. The
observables measured by Alice commute with these, and
so preserve their eigenvalues. Thus if the initial EPR
state of the oscillators were perfect, Alice’s measurement
would also prepare for Bob a simultaneous eigenstate of
the stabilizer generators with
Sq,B ≡ e2piiφq,B = e2piiφq,A ,
Sp,B ≡ e−2piiφp,B = e2piiφp,A , (45)
or
qB = qA (mod
√
pi) ,
pB = −pA (mod
√
pi) . (46)
Similarly, the initial state was an eigenstate with eigen-
value one of the observables
X¯A(φp)⊗ X¯B(φp) , Z¯A(φq)⊗ Z¯B(φq)−1 , (47)
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which also commute with the stabilizer generators that
Alice measured. Thus Alice’s measurement has prepared
an encoded Bell pair in the code space labeled by (φq, φp),
the state
|φ¯+〉AB = 1√
2
(|0¯〉A|0¯〉B + |1¯〉A|1¯〉B) . (48)
Of course the initial EPR pair shared by Alice and Bob
might be imperfect, and then the encoded state produced
by Alice’s measurement will also have errors. But if the
EPR pair is not too noisy, they can correct the errors with
high probability. Alice broadcasts her measured values of
the stabilizer generators to Bob; Bob also measures the
stabilizer generators and compares his values to those
reported by Alice, obtaining a relative syndrome
ei(φq,A−φq,B) , e−i(φp,A+φp,B) . (49)
That is, the relative syndrome determines the value of
qA − qB (mod
√
pi), and pA + pB (mod
√
pi). Using this
information, Bob can shift his oscillator’s q and p (by an
amount between −√pi/2 and √pi/2) to adjust qA − qB
(mod
√
pi), and pA + pB (mod
√
pi) both to zero. The
result is that Alice and Bob now share a bipartite state
in the code subspace labeled by (φq, φp).
If the initial noisy EPR state differs from the ideal EPR
state only by relative shifts of Bob’s oscillator relative to
Alice’s that satisfy |∆q|, |∆p| < √pi/2, then the shifts
will be corrected perfectly. And if larger shifts are highly
unlikely, then Alice and Bob will obtain a state that ap-
proximates the desired encoded Bell pair |φ¯+〉 with good
fidelity. This procedure is a “distillation” protocol in that
Alice and Bob start out with a noisy entangled state in
a tensor product of infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces,
and “distill” from it a far cleaner entangled state in a
tensor product of two-dimensional subspaces.
Once Alice and Bob have distilled an encoded Bell pair,
they can use it to generate a key bit, via the usual EPR
key distribution protocol: Alice decides at random to
measure either X¯ or Z¯, and then publicly reveals what
she chose to measure but not the measurement outcome.
Bob then measures the same observable and obtains the
same outcome – that outcome is the shared key bit.
How do they measure X¯ or Z¯? If Alice (say) wishes to
measure Z¯, she can measure q, and then subtract φq from
the outcome. The value of Z¯ is determined by whether
the result is an even (Z¯ = 1) or an odd (Z¯ = −1) mul-
tiple of
√
pi. Similarly, if Alice wants to measure X¯ , she
measures p and subtracts φp – The value of X¯ is deter-
mined by whether the result is an even (X¯ = 1) or an
odd (X¯ = −1) multiple of √pi.
Imperfections in the initial EPR pairs are inescapable
not just because of experimental realities, but also be-
cause the ideal EPR pairs are unphysical nonnormal-
izable states. Likewise, the stabilizer operators cannot
even in principle be measured with arbitrary precision
(the result would be an infinite bit string), but only to
some finite m-bit accuracy. Still, if the EPR pairs have
reasonably good fidelity, and the measurements have rea-
sonably good resolution, entanglement purification will
be successful.
To summarize, Alice and Bob can generate a shared bit
by using the continuous variable code for entanglement
purification, carrying out this protocol:
Key distribution with entanglement purification
1: Alice prepares (a good approximation to) an EPR
state of two oscillators, a simultaneous eigenstate
of qA − qB = 0 = pA + pB, and sends one of the
oscillators to Bob.
2: After Bob confirms receipt, Alice and Bob each
measure (to m bits of accuracy) the two commut-
ing stabilizer generators of the code, ei(2
√
pi)q and
e−i(2
√
pi)p. (Equivalently, they each measure the
value of q and p modulo
√
pi.) Alice broadcasts her
result to Bob, and Bob applies shifts in q and p to
his oscillator, so that his values of q and p mod-
ulo
√
pi now agree with Alice’s (to m-bit accuracy).
Thus, Alice and Bob have prepared (a very good
approximation to) a Bell state |φ¯+〉 of two qubits
encoded in one of the simultaneous eigenspaces of
the two stabilizer operators.
3: Alice decides at random to measure one of the en-
coded operators X¯ or Z¯; then she announces what
she chose to measure, but not the outcome. Bob
measures the same observable; the result is the
shared bit that they have generated.
Now notice that, except for Bob’s confirmation that he
received the states, this protocol requires only one-way
classical communication from Alice to Bob. Alice does
not need to receive any information from Bob before she
measures her stabilizer operators or before she measures
the encoded operation X¯ or Z¯. Therefore, the protocol
works just as well if Alice measures her oscillator before
sending the other one to Bob. Equivalently, she prepares
an encoded state, adopting randomly selected values of
the stabilizer generators. She also decides at random
whether the encoded state will be an X¯ eigenstate or a
Z¯ eigenstate, and whether the eigenvalue will be +1 or
−1.
Again, since the codewords are unphysical nonnormal-
izable states, Alice can’t really prepare a perfectly en-
coded state; she must settle for a “good enough” approx-
imate codeword.
In summary, we can replace the entanglement-
purification protocol with this equivalent protocol:
Key distribution with encoded qubits
1: Alice chooses random values (tom bits of accuracy)
for the stabilizer generators ei(2
√
pi)q and e−i(2
√
pi)p,
chooses a random bit to decide whether to encode
a Z¯ eigenstate or an X¯ eigenstate, and chooses an-
other random bit to decide whether the eigenvalue
10
will be ±1. She then prepares (a good approxima-
tion to) the encoded eigenstate of the chosen oper-
ator with the chosen eigenvalue in the chosen code,
and sends it to Bob.
2: After Bob confirms receipt, Alice broadcasts the
stabilizer eigenvalues and whether she encoded a Z¯
or an X¯.
3: Bob measures q or p. He subtracts from his out-
come the value modulo
√
pi determined by Alice’s
announced value of the stabilizer generator, and
corrects the result to the nearest integer multiple
of
√
pi. He extracts a bit determined by whether the
multiple of
√
pi is even or odd; this is the shared bit
that they have generated.
To carry out this protocol, Alice requires sophisti-
cated tools that enable her to prepare the approximate
codewords, and Bob needs a quantum memory to store
the state that he receives until he hears Alice’s classical
broadcast. However, we can reduce the protocol to one
that is much less technically demanding.
When Bob extracts the key bit by measuring (say) q,
he needs Alice’s value of q modulo
√
pi, but he does not
need her value of the other stabilizer generator. There-
fore, there is no need for Alice to send it; surely, the
eavesdropper will be no better off if Alice sends less clas-
sical information. If she doesn’t send the value of Sp, then
we can consider the protocol averaged over the unknown
value of this generator. Formally, for perfect (nonnor-
malizable) codewords the density matrix describing the
state that is accessible to a potential eavesdropper then
has a definite value of Sq but is averaged over all possible
values of Sp – it is a (nonnormalizable) equally weighted
superposition of all position eigenstates with a specified
value of q mod
√
pi; e.g. in the case where Alice prepares
a Z¯ eigenstate, we have
ρ(φq, Z¯ = 1)
∝
∑
s
|q = (2s+ φq)
√
pi〉〈q = (2s+ φq)
√
pi| ,
ρ(φq, Z¯ = −1)
∝
∑
s
|q = (2s+ 1 + φq)
√
pi〉〈q = (2s+ 1 + φq)
√
pi| .
(50)
Averaged over φq as well, Alice is sending a random po-
sition eigenstate. Likewise, in the case where Alice pre-
pares an X¯ eigenstate, she sends a random momentum
eigenstate.
Therefore, the protocol in which Alice prepares en-
coded qubits can be replaced by a protocol that is simpler
to execute but is no less effective and no less secure. In-
stead of bothering to prepare the encoded qubit, she just
decides at random to send either a q or p eigenstate, with
a random eigenvalue. If Bob had a quantum memory, he
could store the state, and wait to hear from Alice whether
the state she sent was a q or p eigenstate; then he could
measure that observable. Subtracting φq
√
pi (or φp
√
pi)
from his measurement outcome, he would obtain an even
or odd multiple of
√
pi.
But Bob does not really need the quantum memory.
As in the BB84 protocol, it suffices for Bob to decide
at random to measure either q or p, and then publicly
compare his basis with Alice’s. They discard the results
where they used different bases and retain the others.
A problem with this procedure is that the position and
momentum eigenstates are unphysical nonnormalizable
states, and the probability distribution that Alice sam-
ples to decide on what value of q or p to send is also
nonnormalizable. For it to implementable, we need to
modify the procedure so that Alice sends narrow q or p
wave packets, and chooses the position of the center of
the wave packet by sampling a broad but normalizable
distribution.
Therefore, Alice and Bob can adopt the following pro-
tocol:
Key distribution with squeezed states
1: Alice chooses a random bit to decide whether to
send a state squeezed in q or in p. She samples
a (discrete approximation to) a probability distri-
bution Ppos(q) or Pmom(p) to choose a value of q
or p, and then sends to Bob a narrow wave packet
centered at that value.
2: Bob receives the state and decides at random to
measure either q or p.
3: After Bob confirms receipt, Alice and Bob broad-
cast whether they sent/measured in the q or p basis.
If they used different bases, they discard their re-
sults. If they used the same basis, they retain the
result and proceed to Step 4.
4: Alice broadcasts the value that she sent, modulo√
pi (to m-bit accuracy). Bob subtracts Alice’s
value from what he measured, and corrects to the
nearest integer multiple of
√
pi. He and Alice ex-
tract their shared bit according to whether this in-
teger is even or odd.
V. A SECURE PROTOCOL USING
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Now we are ready to combine the protocol of §III with
the protocol of §IV. The result is a protocol based on con-
catenating the continuous variable code with an [[n, k, d]]
binary CSS code. The concatenated code embeds a
k-dimensional Hilbert space in the infinite-dimensional
Hilbert space of n oscillators.
Again, we first imagine that Alice and Bob carry out an
entanglement distillation protocol. They start out shar-
ing n pairs of oscillators, each in a (noisy) EPR state. By
measuring the stabilizer generators of the concatenated
code, they distill k encoded Bell pairs of much better fi-
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delity, and then generate a key by measuring the encoded
Bell pairs.
By once again following the chain of reductions re-
counted in §III and §IV, we arrive at an equivalent proto-
col involving transmission of squeezed states. The com-
plete protocol, including verification, error correction,
and privacy amplification, becomes:
Continuous-variable QKD
1: Alice has (4 + δ)n oscillators. For each oscillator,
Alice decides at random to prepare either a state
squeezed in q or a state squeezed in p. The posi-
tion of the squeezed state is determined by sam-
pling (a discrete approximation to) a probability
distribution Ppos(q) or Pmom(p). Alice then sends
the oscillators to Bob.
2: Bob receives the (4+δ)n oscillators, measuring each
in the q or p basis at random.
3: Bob confirms that the oscillators have been re-
ceived, and then Alice announces whether each os-
cillator was squeezed in q or in p.
4: Alice and Bob discard the results in the cases where
Bob measured in a different basis than Alice used
in her preparation. With high probability, there
are at least 2n measured values left (if not, abort
the protocol). Alice decides randomly on a set of
2n values to use for the protocol, and chooses at
random n of these to be check values.
5: For all 2n measured values, Alice announces the
value of q or p modulo
√
pi (to m bits of accuracy).
6: Bob subtracts the corresponding number an-
nounced by Alice from each of his measured values,
and then corrects the result to the nearest integer
multiple of
√
pi. Bob and Alice now extract bit val-
ues determined by whether the multiple of
√
pi is
even or odd.
7: Alice and Bob announce the values of their check
bits. If too few of the check bits agree, they abort
the protocol.
8: Alice announces u + v, where u is the string con-
sisting of the remaining non-check bits, and v is a
random codeword in C1.
9: Bob subtracts u + v from his code qubits, u + e,
and corrects the result, v+ e, to a codeword in C1.
With high probability, Bob recovers v.
10: Alice and Bob use the C2 coset v + C2 as the key.
Here, to be specific, we have instructed Alice and Bob
to sacrifice n check bits for each n bits that are used for
key distribution. They might instead use fewer or more,
depending on how stringent a bound on the eavesdrop-
per’s mutual information they require.
The check bits provide Alice and Bob with estimates
of the bit error rates pZ (respectively pX) when states
squeezed in q (respectively p) are transmitted. Our anal-
ysis of the BB84 protocol indicates that the squeezed
state protocol is secure provided that pZ and pX are both
below 11%, and assuming that Alice and Bob scramble
and unscramble the oscillators (by applying a random
permutation and its inverse).
However, as noted in §III D, the proof and the security
criterion pZ , pX < 11% apply only if Alice’s source can
be simulated by measuring half of an entangled state of
two oscillators. In particular, we may imagine that Alice
has many pairs of oscillators identically prepared in the
state ρAB, and that she prepares the state that she sends
to Bob by measuring oscillator A. When she measures in
the q basis, she sends the state
ρB(q) =
A〈q|ρAB |q〉A
tr (A〈q|ρAB|q〉A) (51)
with probability
Ppos(q) = tr (A〈q|ρAB|q〉A) , (52)
and when she measures in the p basis, she sends the state
ρB(p) =
A〈p|ρAB|p〉A
tr (A〈q|ρAB|q〉A) (53)
with probability
Pmom(p) = tr (A〈p|ρAB |p〉A) . (54)
Thus, the states that Alice sends need not be perfect po-
sition or momentum eigenstates for the proof of security
to work, and Alice’s source might even have a bias so that
the raw key bit carried by an oscillator is more likely to
be a 0 than a 1. Still, for a source of this type, if Alice
and Bob verify that the error rate for the raw key bits is
below 11% in both bases, then the protocol is provably
secure. We will discuss examples in §VI and§VII.
p
q
FIG. 1. One-sigma contours of the Wigner functions for
typical squeezed states used in the quantum key distribution
protocol, with squeeze factor ∆˜ = e−r = 1/2. The signal
states squeezed in p and in q overlap with one another, pre-
venting Eve from learning about one without disturbing the
other.
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Intuitively, the squeezed state protocol is secure be-
cause the eavesdropper cannot monitor the value of q
(or p) transmitted without introducing a detectable dis-
turbance in the complementary observable p (or q). As
shown in Fig. 1, the Wigner functions of the signal states
squeezed in p and in q overlap, so that the states cannot
be reliably distinguished.
VI. GAUSSIAN STATES
Perfectly squeezed states (position or momentum
eigenstates) are unphysical nonnormalizable states, so
the protocol will actually be carried out with imperfectly
squeezed states. Furthermore, engineering a source that
produces highly squeezed states would be quite techni-
cally demanding. How much squeezing is really needed
for the protocol to be secure? A related question is, how
must we choose the probability distributions Ppos(q) and
Pmom(p) that govern the center of the squeezed state?
We will analyze the most favorable case, in which the
squeezed states are Gaussian wave packets and the prob-
ability distributions are also Gaussian. We will begin
again with a description of how the code is used for en-
tanglement purification, but where Alice and Bob start
with many copies of a Gaussian entangled pair of oscil-
lators that is an approximate eigenstate of qA − qB and
pA + pB. If we imagine that Alice measures half of each
pair before she sends the other half to Bob, then we ob-
tain a protocol in which Alice sends imperfectly squeezed
states governed by a particular probability distribution.
The initial Gaussian entangled state of the two oscil-
lators is
|ψ(∆)〉AB = 1√
pi
∫
dqAdqB exp
[
−1
2
∆2
(
qA + qB
2
)2]
× exp
[
−1
2
(qA − qB)2 /∆2
]
|qA, qB〉
=
1√
pi
∫
dpAdpB exp
[
−1
2
∆2
(
pA − pB
2
)2]
× exp
[
−1
2
(pA + pB)
2 /∆2
]
|pA, pB〉 , (55)
where ∆2 is real and positive. Since |ψ(∆)〉AB is actually
invariant under
∆2 → 4/∆2 , qB → −qB , pB → −pB (56)
we may assume without loss of generality (changing the
sign of the position and momentum of Bob’s oscillator
if necessary), that 0 < ∆2 ≤ 2. In the limiting case
∆2 = 2, |ψ(∆)〉AB becomes the product of two oscillator
vacuum states. For ∆2 < 2, it is an entangled state. The
amount of entanglement shared between the oscillators,
in “ebits,” is defined as
E(∆) ≡ S(ρA) = −tr ρA log2 ρA , (57)
(the Von Neumann entropy of Alice’s density matrix
ρA = trB|ψ(∆)〉〈ψ(∆)|), and can be expressed as [17]
E(∆) = (cosh2 r) log2(cosh
2 r)
− (sinh2 r) log2(sinh2 r) , (58)
where
∆2 ≡ 2e−2r . (59)
In this entangled state, if Alice measures the position
of her oscillator and obtains the outcome qA, she prepares
for Bob the Gaussian state
|ψ(qA)〉B = 1
(pi∆˜2)1/4
∫
dqB
× exp
(
−1
2
(qB − qB0)2/∆˜2
)
|qB〉 , (60)
where
qB0 =
(
1− 14∆4
1 + 14∆
4
)
qA =
(
1− ∆˜4
)1/2
qA , (61)
and
∆˜2 =
∆2
1 + 14∆
4
. (62)
The probability distribution for the outcome of Alice’s
measurement can be expressed as
P (qA) =
∆˜√
pi
exp
(
−∆˜2q2A
)
, (63)
and we can easily see from eq. (55) that if Alice and Bob
both measure q, then the difference of their outcomes is
governed by the probability distribution
Prob(qA − qB) = 1√
pi∆2
exp[−(qA − qB)2/∆2] . (64)
Similar formulas apply if Alice and Bob measure p.
Suppose that Alice and Bob try to distill one good
qubit from the imperfect entangled state |ψ(∆)〉AB .
They both measure the stabilizer generators, that is, the
values of q and pmodulo
√
pi. Alice broadcasts her values,
and Bob adjusts his values so that they agree with Al-
ice’s; thereby they obtain a pair of encoded qubits, which
would have been in the state |φ¯+〉 if the initial pair of os-
cillators had been a perfect EPR pair (∆2 = 0). Then
if Alice and Bob were to proceed to perform a complete
Bell measurement on their encoded qubit pair, the prob-
ability pZ that they would find Z¯ ⊗ Z¯ = −1 is no worse
than the probability that, if qA and qB were measured,
the results would differ by more than
√
pi/2, or
pZ ≤ 2√
pi∆2
∫ ∞
√
pi/2
dq e−q
2/∆2
≤ 2∆
pi
exp(−pi/4∆2) , (65)
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and similarly for pX (the probability that X¯ ⊗ X¯ = −1).
For the values of ∆ that are typically of interest (e.g. ∆ <
1), the error probability is dominated by values of qA−qB
(or pA + pB) lying in the range [
√
pi/2, 3
√
pi/2], so that
the estimate of the error probability can be sharpened to
pZ , pX ∼ 2√
pi∆2
∫ 3√pi/2
√
pi/2
dq e−q
2/∆2 . (66)
After error correction and measurement in the encoded
Bell basis, the initial bipartite pure state of two oscilla-
tors, with entanglement E given by eq. (58) and (59), is
reduced to a bipartite mixed state, diagonal in the en-
coded Bell basis, with fidelity F = (1− pZ)(1− pX); this
encoded state has entanglement of formation [13]
E = H2
(
1
2
+
√
F (1− F )
)
(67)
(where H2 is the binary entropy function).
If Alice and Bob have a large number n of oscillators in
the state |ψ(∆)〉AB , they can carry out an entanglement
distillation protocol based on the concatenation of the
single-oscillator code with a binary CSS code, and they
will be able to distill qubits of arbitrarily good fidelity
at a finite asymptotic rate provided that pZ and pX are
both below 11%; from eq. (66) we find that this condition
is satisfied for ∆ < .784 (which should be compared with
the value ∆ =
√
2 corresponding to a product of two
oscillators each in its vacuum state). Thus secure EPR
key distribution is possible in principle with two-mode
squeezed states provided that the squeeze parameter r
satisfies r > − loge(.784/
√
2) = .590; from eq. (58) and
(67), ∆ = .784 corresponds to E = 1.19 ebits carried by
each oscillator pair, which is reduced by error correction
and encoded Bell measurement to E = .450 ebits carried
by each of the encoded Bell pairs.
Now consider the reduction of this entanglement dis-
tillation protocol to a protocol in which Alice prepares
a squeezed state and sends it to Bob. In the squeezed-
state scheme, Alice sends the state |ψ(qA)〉 with proba-
bility P (qA). The width ∆˜ of the state that Alice sends
is related to the parameter ∆ appearing in the estimated
error probability according to
∆−2 = ∆˜−2 · 1
2
(1 +
√
1− ∆˜4) . (68)
The state Alice sends is centered not at qA but at
qB0 = qA · (1 − ∆˜4)1/2. Nevertheless, in the squeezed
state protocol that we obtain as a reduction of the en-
tanglement distillation protocol, it is qA rather than qB0
that Alice uses to extract a key bit, and whose value mod-
ulo
√
pi she reports to Bob. The error probability that is
required to be below 11% to ensure security is the prob-
ability that error correction adjusts Bob’s measurement
outcome to a value that differs from qA (not qB0) by an
odd multiple of
√
pi. As we have noted, this error prob-
ability is below 11% for ∆ < .784, which (from eq. (62))
corresponds to ∆˜ < .749; this value should be compared
to the value ∆˜ = 1 for an oscillator in its vacuum state.
Thus, secure squeezed-state key distribution is possible
in principle using single-mode squeezed states, provided
that the squeeze parameter r defined by ∆˜ = e−r satisfies
r > − loge(.749) = .289. When interpreted as suppres-
sion, relative to vacuum noise, of the quantum noise af-
flicting the squeezed observable, this amount of squeezing
can be expressed as 10 · log10
(
∆˜−2
)
= 2.51 dB.
The error rate is below 1% for ∆˜ < .483 (∆ < .486),
and drops precipitously for more highly squeezed states,
e.g., to below 10−6 for ∆˜ ∼ ∆ < .256. For example,
if the noise in the channel is weak, Alice and Bob can
use the Gaussian squeezed state protocol with ∆˜ ∼ 1/2
(see Fig. 2) to generate a shared bit via the q or p channel
with an error rate (∼ 1.2%) comfortably below 11%; thus
the protocol is secure if augmented with classical binary
error correction and privacy amplification.
-4 -2 2 4
q or p
P
FIG. 2. Probability distributions for the squeezed quan-
tum key distribution protocol, with squeeze factor ∆˜ = 1/2.
The dotted line is the probability distribution P (a Gaus-
sian with variance (1/2∆˜2) · (1− ∆˜4)) that Alice samples to
determine the center of the squeezed signal that she sends.
The solid lines are the probability distributions in position or
momentum of the squeezed states (Gaussians with variance
∆˜2/2, shown with a different vertical scale than P ) centered
at −
√
pi, 0, and
√
pi. The intrinsic error probability due to im-
perfect squeezing (prior to binary error correction and privacy
amplification) is 1.2%.
Of course, if the channel noise is significant, there
will be a more stringent limit on the required squeez-
ing. Many kinds of noise (for instance, absorption of
photons in an optical fiber) will cause a degradation of
the squeezing factor. If this is the only consequence of
the noise, the squeezing exiting the channel should still
satisfy ∆ < .784 for the protocol to be secure, as we dis-
cuss in more detail in §VII. Otherwise, the errors due to
imperfect squeezing must be added to errors from other
causes to determine the overall error rate.
So far we have described the case where the p states
and the q states are squeezed by equal amounts. The pro-
tocol works just as well in the case of unequal squeezing,
if we adjust the error correction procedure accordingly.
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Consider carrying out the entanglement distillation using
the code with general parameter α rather than α = 1.
The error rates are unaffected if the squeezing in q and
p is suitably rescaled, so that the width of the q and p
states becomes
∆q = ∆ · α , ∆p = ∆/α . (69)
In this modified protocol, Alice broadcasts the value of
q modulo
√
pi · α or the value of p modulo √pi/α. Bob
subtracts the value broadcast by Alice from his own mea-
surement outcome, and then adjusts the difference he ob-
tains to the nearest multiple of
√
pi ·α or √pi/α. The key
bit is determined by whether the multiple of
√
pi · α, or√
pi/α, is even or odd.
Thus, for example, the error rate sustained due to im-
perfect squeezing will have the same (acceptably small)
value irrespective of whether Alice sends states with
∆q = ∆p = 1/2, or ∆q = 1 and ∆p = 1/4; Alice can
afford to send coherent states about half the time if she
increases the squeezing of her other transmissions by a
compensating amount.
Can we devise a secure quantum key distribution
scheme in which Alice always sends coherent states? To
obtain, as a reduction of an entanglement distillation pro-
tocol, a protocol in which coherent states (∆˜ = 1) are
always transmitted, we must consider the case ∆2 = 2.
But in that case, the initial state of Alice’s and Bob’s
oscillators is a product state. Bob’s value of q or p is
completely uncorrelated with Alice’s, and the protocol
obviously won’t work. This observation does not exclude
secure quantum key distribution schemes using coherent
states, but if they exist another method would be needed
to prove the security of such schemes.
In general, the source that we obtain by measuring
half of the entangled pair is biased. If ∆ is not small
compared to
√
pi, then Alice is significantly more likely
to generate a 0 than a 1 as her raw key bit. But as we
have already discussed in §III D, after error correction
and privacy amplification, the protocol is secure if pX and
pZ are both less than 11%. This result follows because
the squeezed state protocol is obtained as a reduction of
an entanglement distillation protocol.
VII. LOSSES AND OTHER IMPERFECTIONS
The ideal BB84 quantum key distribution protocol is
provably secure. But in practical settings, the protocol
cannot be implemented perfectly, and the imperfections
can compromise its security. (See [18] for a recent discus-
sion.) For example, if the transmitted qubit is a photon
polarization state carried by an optical fiber, losses in
the fiber, detector inefficiencies, and dark counts in the
detector all can impose serious limitations. In particular,
if the photons travel a distance large compared to the at-
tenuation length of the fiber, then detection events will
be dominated by dark counts, leading to an unacceptably
large error rate.
Furthermore, most present-day implementations of
quantum cryptography use, not single photon pulses,
but weak coherent pulses; usually the source “emits”
the vacuum state, occasionally it emits a single photon,
and with nonnegligible probability it emits two or more
photons. Quantum key distribution with weak coherent
pulses is vulnerable to a “photon number splitting” at-
tack, in which the eavesdropper diverts extra photons,
and acquires complete information about their polariza-
tion without producing any detectable disturbance. A
weaker pulse is less susceptible to photon number split-
ting, but increases the risk that the detector will be
swamped by dark counts.
From a practical standpoint, quantum key distribution
with squeezed states may not necessarily be better than
BB84, but it is certainly different. Alice requires a source
that produces a specified squeezed state on demand; for-
tunately, the amount of squeezing needed to ensure the
security of the protocol is relatively modest. Bob uses
homodyne detection to measure a specified quadrature
amplitude; this measurement may be less sensitive to de-
tector defects than the single-photon measurement re-
quired in BB84.
But, as in the BB84 protocol, losses due to the ab-
sorption of photons in the channel will enhance the error
rate in squeezed-state quantum key distribution, and so
will limit the distance over which secure key exchange is
possible. We study this effect by modeling the loss as a
damping channel described by the master equation
ρ˙ = Γ
(
aρa† − 1
2
a†aρ− 1
2
ρa†a
)
; (70)
here ρ is the density operator of the oscillator, a is the
annihilation operator, and Γ is the decay rate. Eq. (70)
implies that
d
dt
〈a†kal〉t = −1
2
(k + l)Γ〈a†kal〉t , (71)
where
〈O〉t = tr (Oρ(t)) (72)
denotes the expectation value of the operator O at time
t. Integrating, we find
〈a†kal〉T = e− 12 (k+l)ΓT 〈a†kal〉0 , (73)
and so, by expanding in power series,
〈: f(a†, a) :〉T = 〈: f(ξa†, ξa) :〉0 , ξ = e−ΓT/2 (74)
where f is an analytic function, and : f : denotes normal
ordering (that is, in : f(a†, a) :, all a†’s are placed to the
left of all a’s).
In particular, by normal ordering and applying
eq. (74), we find
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〈eiβq〉T = e− 14 (1−ξ
2)β2〈eiβξq〉0 , (75)
where q =
(
a+ a†
)
/
√
2 is the position operator. A sim-
ilar formula applies to the momentum operator or any
other quadrature amplitude. Eq. (75) shows that if the
initial state at t = 0 is Gaussian (q is governed by a Gaus-
sian probability distribution), then so is the final state at
t = T [19]. The mean 〈q〉 and variance ∆q2 of the initial
and final distributions are related by
〈q〉T = ξ〈q〉0 ,(
∆q2T −
1
2
)
= ξ2
(
∆q20 −
1
2
)
. (76)
Now let’s revisit the analysis of §VI, taking into ac-
count the effects of losses. We imagine that Alice pre-
pares entangled pairs of oscillators in the state eq. (55),
and sends one oscillator to Bob through the lossy channel;
then they perform entanglement purification. This pro-
tocol reduces to one in which Alice prepares a squeezed
state that is transmitted to Bob. In the squeezed-
state protocol, Alice decides what squeezed state to send
by sampling the probability distribution P (qA) given in
eq. (63); if she chooses the value qA, then she prepares
and sends the state |ψ(qA)〉 in eq. (60). When it enters
the channel, this state is governed by the probability dis-
tribution
P (qB|qA) = 1
∆˜
√
pi
exp
(
−(qB − qB0)2/∆˜2
)
, (77)
and when Bob receives the state this distribution has,
according to eq. (76), evolved to
P ′(qB|qA) = 1
∆′
√
pi
exp
(−(qB − q′B0)2/∆′2) , (78)
where
q′B0 = ξqB0 ≡ ξ(1 − ∆˜4)1/2qA ,
∆′2 = ξ2∆˜2 + (1− ξ2) . (79)
By integrating over qA in P
′(qA, qB) = P ′(qB|qA)·P (qA),
we can obtain the final marginal distribution for the dif-
ference qA − qB:
P ′(qA − qB ; ξ) = 1
∆ξ
√
pi
exp
(−(qA − qB)2/∆2ξ) ,
∆−2ξ =
∆˜2
1 + ξ2 − 2ξ(1− ∆˜4)1/2 + (1− ξ2)∆˜2 , (80)
which generalizes eq. (68). We can express the damping
factor ξ as
ξ = e−κd/2 , (81)
where d is the length of the channel and κ−1 is its at-
tenuation length (typically of the order of 10 km in an
optical fiber).
The protocol is secure if the error rate in both bases
is below 11%; as in §VI, this condition is satisfied for
∆ξ < .784. Thus we can calculate, as a function of the
initial squeezing parameter ∆˜, the maximum distance
dmax that the signal states can be transmitted without
compromising the security of the protocol.
For ∆˜≪ 1, we find
κ dmax = (1.57) · ∆˜ +O(∆˜2) . (82)
Thus, the more highly squeezed the input signal, the less
we can tolerate the losses in the channel. This feature,
which sounds surprising on first hearing, arises because
the amount of squeezing is linked with the size of the
range in qA that Alice samples. Errors are not unlikely if
losses cause the value of qB to decay by an amount com-
parable to
√
pi/2. In our protocol, if the squeezed states
have a small width ∆˜, then the typical states prepared by
Alice are centered at a large value qA ∼ ∆˜−1; therefore,
a small fractional decay can cause an error.
maxdκ
i∆
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amplification
with
amplification
FIG. 3. The effect of channel losses on the security of
quantum key distribution using squeezed states. The maxi-
mum length κdmax of the channel (in units of the attenuation
length) is plotted as a function of the width ∆˜ of the squeezed
state that enters the channel. For a longer channel, the error
rate due to losses is too large and the proof of security breaks
down. The curve labeled “with amplification” applies to the
protocol in which the signal is amplified prior to detection in
order to compensate for the losses; the curve labeled “without
amplification” applies to the protocol in which the signal is
not amplified.
On the other hand, even without losses, Alice needs
to send states with ∆˜ < .749 to attain a low enough
error rate, and as ∆˜ approaches .749 from below, again
only a small loss is required to push the error probability
over 11%. Thus there is an intermediate value of ∆˜ that
optimizes the value of dmax, as shown in Fig. 3. This
optimal distance,
κ dmax,opt ≈ .367 , (83)
is attained for ∆˜ ∼ .426.
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Our analysis so far applies if Alice and Bob have no
prior knowledge about the properties of the channel. But
if the loss ξ2 = e−κd is known accurately, they might
achieve a lower error rate if Bob compensates for the loss
by multiplying his measurement outcome by ξ−1 before
proceeding with error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion. This amplification of the signal by Bob is entirely
classical, but to analyze the security in this case, we may
consider an entanglement purification scenario in which
Bob applies a quantum amplifier to the signal before mea-
suring. Since the quantum amplifier (which amplifies all
quadrature amplitudes, not just the one that Bob mea-
sures) is noisier, the protocol will be no less secure if Bob
uses a classical amplifier rather than a quantum one.
So now we consider whether entanglement purification
will succeed, where the channel acting on Bob’s oscillator
in each EPR pair consists of transmission through the
lossy fiber followed by processing in Bob’s amplifier. If
the error rate is low enough, the key will be secure even if
the amplifier, as well as the optical fiber, are under Eve’s
control.
Bob’s linear amplifier can be modeled by a master
equation like eq. (70), but with a and a† interchanged,
and where Γ is now interpreted as a rate of gain. The
solution is similar to eq. (74), except the normal order-
ing is replaced by anti-normal ordering (all a’s are placed
to the left of all a†’s), and with ξ2 replaced by the gain
ξ−2 = eΓT ≥ 1. We conclude that the amplifier trans-
forms a Gaussian input state to a Gaussian output state,
and that the mean 〈q〉 and variance ∆q2 of the Gaussian
position distribution are modified according to
〈q〉 → ξ−1〈q〉 ,
∆q2 → ξ−2∆q2 + 1
2
(
ξ−2 − 1) . (84)
Other quadrature amplitudes are transformed similarly.
Now suppose that a damping channel with loss ξ2 is
followed by an amplifier with gain ξ−2. Then the mean
of the position distribution is left unchanged, but the
variance evolves as
∆q2 → ξ−2
(
ξ2∆q2 +
1
2
(
1− ξ2))+ 1
2
(
ξ−2 − 1)
= ∆q2 +
(
ξ−2 − 1) . (85)
For this channel, the probability distribution governing
qA − qB is again a Gaussian as in eq. (80), but now its
width is determined by
(∆ξ)
−2
amp =
1
2∆˜
2
1− (1− ∆˜4)1/2 + (ξ−2 − 1)∆˜2 . (86)
Error rates in the q and p bases are below 11%, and the
protocol is provably secure, for (∆ξ)amp < .784.
By solving (∆ξ)amp = .784. we can find the maximum
distance d (where ξ−2 = eκd) for which our proof of se-
curity holds; the result is plotted in Fig. 3. When the
squeezed input is narrow, ∆˜ << 1, the solution becomes
ξ−2 ≡ exp (κ dmax) = 1.307 +O(∆˜2) , (87)
or
κ dmax ≈ .268 . (88)
Comparing the two curves in Fig. 3, we see that the pro-
tocol with amplification remains secure out to longer dis-
tances than the protocol without amplification, if the in-
put is highly squeezed. In that case, the error rate in the
protocol without amplification is dominated by the de-
cay of the signal, which can be corrected by the amplifier.
But if the input is less highly squeezed, then the protocol
without amplification remains secure to longer distances.
In that case, the nonzero width of the signal state con-
tributes significantly to the error rate; the amplifier noise
broadens the state further.
With more sophisticated protocols that incorporate
some form of quantum error correction, continuous-
variable quantum key distribution can be extended to
longer distances. For example, if Alice and Bob share
some noisy pairs of oscillators, they can purify the en-
tanglement using protocols that require two-way classi-
cal communication [11,12]. After pairs with improved
fidelity are distilled, Alice, by measuring a quadrature
amplitude in her laboratory, prepares a squeezed state
in Bob’s; the key bits can be extracted using the same
error correction and privacy amplification schemes that
we have already described.
Our proof of security applies to the case where
squeezed states are carried by a lossy channel (assum-
ing a low enough error rate), because this scenario can
be obtained as a reduction of a protocol in which Alice
and Bob apply entanglement distillation to noisy entan-
gled pairs of oscillators that they share. More generally,
the proof applies to any imperfections that can be ac-
curately modeled as a quantum operation that acts on
the shared pairs before Alice and Bob measure them.
As one example, suppose that when Alice prepares the
squeezed state, it is not really the q or p squeezed state
that the protocol calls for, but is instead slightly rotated
in the quadrature plane. And suppose that when Bob
performs his homodyne measurement, he does not really
measure q or p, but actually measures a slightly rotated
quadrature amplitude. In the entanglement-distillation
scenario, the imperfection of Alice’s preparation can be
modeled as a superoperator that acts on her oscillator be-
fore she makes a perfect quadrature measurement, and
the misalignment of Bob’s measurement can likewise be
modeled by a superoperator acting on his oscillator be-
fore he makes a perfect quadrature measurement. There-
fore, the squeezed state protocol with this type of imper-
fect preparation and measurement is secure, as long as
the error rate is below 11% in both bases. Of course,
this error rate includes both errors caused by the chan-
nel and errors due to the imperfection of the preparation
and measurement.
We also recall that in the protocols of §V, Alice’s
preparation and Bob’s measurement were performed to
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m bits of accuracy. In the entanglement distillation sce-
nario, this finite resolution can likewise be well modeled
by a quantum operation that shifts the oscillators by an
amount of order 2−m before Alice and Bob perform their
measurements. Thus the proof applies, with the finite
resolution included among the effects contributing to the
permissible 11% error rate. The finite accuracy causes
trouble only when Alice’s and Bob’s results lie a distance
apart that is within about 2−m of
√
pi/2; thus, just a few
bits of accuracy should be enough to make this additional
source of error quite small.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have described a secure protocol for quantum key
distribution based on the transmission of squeezed states
of a harmonic oscillator. Conceptually, our protocol re-
sembles the BB84 protocol, in which single qubit states
are transmitted. The BB84 protocol is secure because
monitoring the observable Z causes a detectable distur-
bance in the observable X , and vice versa. The squeezed
state protocol is secure because monitoring the observ-
able q causes a detectable disturbance in the observable
p, and vice versa. Security is ensured even if the ad-
versary uses the most general eavesdropping strategies
allowed by the principles of quantum mechanics.
In secure versions of the BB84 scheme, Alice’s source
should emit single-photons that Bob detects. Since the
preparation of single-photon states is difficult, and pho-
ton detectors are inefficient, at least in some settings
the squeezed-state protocol may have practical advan-
tages, perhaps including a higher rate of key production.
Squeezing is also technically challenging, but the amount
of squeezing required to ensure security is relatively mod-
est.
The protocol we have described in detail uses each
transmitted oscillator to carry one raw key bit. An ob-
vious generalization is a protocol based on the code with
stabilizer generators given in eq. (9), which encodes a
d-dimensional protected Hilbert space in each oscillator.
Then a secure key can be generated more efficiently, but
more squeezing is required to achieve an acceptable error
rate.
Our protocols, including their classical error correction
and privacy amplification, are based on CSS codes: each
of the stabilizer generators is either of the “q”-type (the
exponential of a linear combination of n q’s) or of the “p-
type” (the exponential of a linear combination of n p’s).
The particular CSS codes that we have described in detail
belong to a restricted class: they are concatenated codes
such that each oscillator encodes a single qubit, and then
a block of those single-oscillator qubits are assembled to
encode k better protected qubits using a binary [[n, k, d]]
stabilizer code. There are more general CSS codes that
embed k protected qubits in the Hilbert space of n os-
cillators but do not have this concatenated structure [4];
secure key distribution protocols can be based on these
too. The quantum part of the protocol is still the same,
but the error correction and privacy amplification make
use of more sophisticated close packings of spheres in n
dimensions.
We analyzed a version of the protocol in which Alice
prepares Gaussian squeezed states governed by a Gaus-
sian probability distribution. The states, and the proba-
bility distribution that Alice samples, need not be Gaus-
sian for the protocol to be secure. However, for other
types of states and probability distributions, the error
rates might have to be smaller to ensure the security of
the protocol.
Our proof of security applies to a protocol in which
the squeezed states propagate through a lossy channel,
over a distance comparable to the attentuation length
of the channel. To extend continuous-variable quantum
key distribution to much larger distances, quantum error
correction or entanglement distillation should be invoked.
Strictly speaking, the security proof we have presented
applies if Alice’s state preparation (including the proba-
bility distribution that she samples) can be exactly real-
ized by measuring half of an imperfectly entangled state
of two oscillators. The protocol remains secure if Alice’s
source can be well approximated in this way. Our proof
does not work if Alice occasionally sends two identically
prepared oscillators when she means to send just one; the
eavesdropper can steal the extra copy, and then the pri-
vacy amplification is not guaranteed to reduce the eaves-
dropper’s information to an exponentially small amount.
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